Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

Chevron Oil Company, Doing Business As
Standard Oil Company of California v. Beaver
County, A Legislative Corporation of The State of
Utah, Hyrum L. Lee, Eugene H. Mayer, Howard .J.
Pryor, Constituting The Board of Commissioners
of Beavercounty : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.John O. Christiansen and A.M. Ferro; Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Chevron v. Beaver County, No. 11317 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3454

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CASE

l

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS

2

OF FACTS

3

POINTS RELIED UPON

10

ARGUMENT

13

POINT I. THE ZONING RESOLUTION
OF BEAVER COUNTY IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING CONFISCATORY OF
PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTIES

13

POINT II. NEITHER THE INITIAL ADOPTION OF THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF
BEAVER COUNTY, NOR THE REFUSAL BY
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
TO REZONE PLAINTIFFS' RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITIONS, WAS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY
OR CAPRICIOUS

15

A. ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION WAS
NOT COUNTY'S OBJECTIVE

17

B. PUBLIC NEED MUST BE WEIGHED
AGAINST PRIVATE INTEREST

19

C. STABILITY OF ZONING PLAN NECESSARY

21

~TATEMENT

D.

TOT AL TAX BASE MIGHT BE REDUCED

22

TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued)
Page

E. lNCREASED COST Of COUNTY POLICE
FIRE, HEALTH AND OTHER SERVICES
'

22

F. NO PUBLIC NEED FOR PINE CREEK
FACILITIES

23

G. ALL INTERCHANGES
MAND REZONING

24

COULD

DE-

H. DIFFICULTIES TO SUPERVISE CONDUCT IN REMOTE AREA

25

I. PLAINTIFFS HA VE NO COMPELLING
PRIVATE NEED

25

]. COUNTY COMMISSION KNOWS LOCAL
NEEDS

26

POINT III. THE ZONING RESOLUTION
OF BEAVER COUNTY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION
THAT HIGHWAY SERVICE FECILITIES ARE
NEEDED AT :PINE CREEK HILL THEREBY REQUIRING A REZONING OF PLAINTIFFS'
PROPERTIES ASH-I HIGHWAY-SERVICE

26

A. ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER
COUNTY DOES NOT FREEZE BUSINESS

27

B.
I"'JTENTION WAS TO DEFER DESIGNATION OF LAND AS HIGHWAY SERVICE
UNTIL FUTURE DEVEL OPMBNTS

27

POINT JV. THE ZONING RE50LUTION
OF BEAVER COUNTY JS NOT VOlD AS CONTENDED BY PLAINTIFFS PHTLLTPS PFTROLEUM COMPANY Al\JD DBSFRET fl\JVESTORS
GROUP BY RFASON OF THB FACT THAT IT
~TATES IN ITS PREAMBLE TO BF FOR THE
Ri:;l'.JFFTT OF THF INHABITANTS OF B"RA VER
COUNTY RATHER THAN THF INHABITANTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

28

TABLE OF CONTENTS -

(Continued)
Page

POINT V. THE ADOPTION OF A MASTER PLAN IS NOT A PRE-REQUISITE TO THE
ADOPTION BY A COUNTY OF A ZONING
RESOLUTION

29

POINT VI. BEAVER COUNTY'S ZONING
IS NOT A BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE

30

POINT VII. THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW PROVIDES NO GROUND FOR ALTERATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ACTION

31

SUMMARY

32
Caces Cited

Gay land v. Salt Lake County, 8 U. 2d 307,
358 P. 2d 633

16, 18, 30

Salt Lake County v. Hutchinson, 8 U. 2d 154,
329 P. 2d 657
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 U. 11, 141 P. 2d 704

16
15, 16

Douse v. Salt Lake City, 123 U. 107, 255 P. 2d 723 15, 16, 19
Phi Kappa IotaFraternity v. Salt Lake City,
116 U. 536, 212 P. 2d 177

16

Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 17 U. 2d, 300
410 P. 2d, 764

16

Ex Parte White, 2 34 Pac. 396

27

Wickham v. Becker, 274 Pac. 397
Leighton v. One Williams Street Fund. 343
Fed. 2d, 565

31

TABLE OF

CONT~~TS-

(Continued)
Page

Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 U. 249,
92 P. 2d 724, 726

15

Statutes

10-9-1, 2, 3, UC.A. (1953

15

17-27-9, U.C.A. (1953)

29
30

17-27-13, U.C.A. (1953)

15

17-27-4, U.C.A. (1953)

In the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CHEVRON OIL COMPANY, doing business as
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff and Appellant,
'
-vs.BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative corporation of
the State of Utah, HYRUM 1. LEE, EUGENE H.
MA YER, HOW ARD J PRYOR, constituting the
Board of Commissioners of Beaver County,
Defendants and Respondents
Case No. 11,317
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation, DESERET INVESTORS GROUP,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.BEAVER COUNTY, a legislative corporation of
the State of Utah, HYRUM 1. LEE, EUGENE H.
MA YER, HOW ARD ]. PRYOR, constituting the
B':lard of Commissioners of Beaver County,
Defendants and Respondents. Case No. 11,318

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
RESPO.NDENT'S STATEMENT
Of THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Case No. 11317 and Case No.11318 were consolidated
for trial and were actions brought attacking ( 1) a zoning
resolution adopted by Beaver County, and (2) the validity
of the resolution as applied to the Plaintiffs' property, and
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Case No. 11318 further attacked the denial by the Board
of County Commissioners of Beaver County of Plaintiffs'
petition to have Plaintiffs' property rezoned.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court (C. Nelson Day) held in a memorandum
decision that (1) the zoning resolution of Beaver County is
valid and is valid as applied to the Plaintiffs' properties, (2)
the Board of County Commissioners of Beaver County did
not act unreasonably in denying the Plaintiffs' petition to
amend the ordinance and reclassify Plaintiffs' properties, and
(3) that the Defendants are entitled ro judgment of no cause
of action.
From this decision, the Plaintiffs have appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek an affirmance by the Supreme Court
of the District Judgment.
EXPLANATION OF ABREVIATIONS
The abbreviations used in this Brief, referring to parts
of the Record, are: (H), the hearing before the Beaver County
Commission; (R), Record of the trial; and (D), as the depo·
sition of Dr. Milton Matthews; which was accepted as pare
of the record of the case, by stipulation of the parties, subject
to certain objections of the Defendants, which were overruled by the Court (R-175-6).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants agree with plaintiffs' Statement of Facts
contained in their respective Briefs with the following exceptions:
Defendants contravert that portion of th 1st paragraph
ot Chevron's statement which states: "No master plan was
ever designed or adopted either by the Board of Commissioners
ot the Planning Commission and no survey or study of the
physical, social or economic conditions within the area was
ever made, so far as the records disclose." No master plan
as provided for by Section 17-24-4, U.C.A., 195 3, has been
adopted in Beaver County, but considerable study as to the
existing and future economic and social conditions in the
County was made at the time of the preparation of the Zoning
Resolution of Beaver County. (R-26j-93).
Defendants contravert that portion -0f the 10th paragraph
of Chevron's Statement of Facts which states that the incorporated area of Beaver County contains 200 farms. Such
unincorporated area contains approximately 285 farms. (Premal order) Defendant~ further contravert that portion of the
said 10th paragraph which states: "There are no commercial
enterprises of any kind in the unincorporated area of the
county except a small, recently-built service station which i~
located just outside the city limits of Beaver." The northern
limits of Beaver City are approximately 80 feet north of 600
North Street and the Commercial Zone in the County extends
1,979 feet to the north of said limits as shown by the Zoning
Map attached to Exhibit 1 and said zone has been extended
several hundred feet further to the north since the preparation
of said Zoning Map. At the time of the trial, there existed

4
in said Commercial Zone 5 service stations, 2 restaurants and
2 petroleum storage plants including one of Phillips Petroleum
Company. Since the trial, a portion of a Travelodge Motei
has been constructed in the Commercial Zone.
Defendants contravert that portion of the 5th paragraph
of Chevron's Statement of Facts which states: "No other
property in the county, except that of the companion plaintiffs,
has such access to the interstate freeway." Other interchanges
have comparable access. (Exhibits 14 and 15)
Defendants state the following additional facts:
The zoning resolution of Beaver County, Utah, adopted
by the Board of County Commissioners on May 18, 1959,
being Resolution No. 1-59 and introduced in evidence in
this case, has not been moditied or amended in any respect
insofar as the subject property in the present case is con·
cerned. (Pre-trial Order).
The only plan for zoning the unincorporated area of
Beaver County which the Planning Commission or the Board
of County Commissioners ever adopted consists of the zoning
resolution HSelt which was passed by the Board of County
Commissioners as above stated. The text of said Zoning Reso·
lution has been amended since the adoption of said resolution,
but such amendments do not affect this litigation since neither
the requirements governing the G-1 Grazing Zone nor the
requirements governing the H-1 Highway Service Zone were
thereby modified. Sai<l zoning resolution covers all of the
unincorporated territory in the County, but no master plan,
as provided for by Section 17-27-4, Utah CoJe Annotated,
1953, was ever adopted. (Pre-trial Order).
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The only map of such unincorporated territory
made by the Planning Commission as part of the plan is
rhe map which was imroducd in evidence at che pre-trial as
a part of Exhibit No. l. Some of the property shown on said
map have been rezoned by preceedings which have identified
the properties affected by metes and bounds descriptions;
however, none of the property involved in this action and no
property in the near vicinity thereof has been rezoned. (Premal Order).
Chevron Oil Company is the record owner of the property
Jescribed in paragraph ''l'' of its complaint on file in this
matter. At the time of the adoption of said zoning resolution,
said property was a part of a larger tract consisting of at least
360 acres owned by one Ellis Yardley. The property now
owned by Chevron Oil Company was first severed from the
said larger tract by a conveyance thereof {rom the said
Yardley to Deseret Investors Group in November, 1964, and
conveyed from Deseret Investors Group to Chevron Oil
Company in August, 1965. (Pre-trial Order). Said property
belonging to Chevron contains approximately 5 acres. (Chevron's Complaint).
Phillips Petroleum Company is the record owner of the
property described in paragraph "l" of its complaint on file
in this matter. At the time of the adoption of said zoning
resolution, said property was a part of a larger tract consisting
of 120 acres owned by one Turner. The property now owned
by Phillips Petroleum Company was first severed from the
said larger tract and conveyed to Phillips Petroleum Company
in September, 1964. (Pre-trial Order) Said property belonging
ro Phillips containing approximately 10 acres. (Phillips Complaint)
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The property which Deseret Investors Group seeks to
have rezoned was acquired by Deseret Investors Group in 1964.
The land sought to be rezoned is a small portion of the land
so acquired. (Exhibits 28 and 29; Deseret's Complaint).
The properties owned by Chevron Oil Company and
Phillips Petroleum Company above mentioned abut on U.~.
Interstate Highway 15 and on the proposed Milford Highway,
and are located at what is called the Pine Creek Interchange,
which interchange is south of the boundary line between
Millard County and Beaver County, and is approximately
rwenty-one (21) miles North of the city of Beaver. (Pre-trial
Order) The town of Kanosh in Millard County and the towns
of Joseph and Sevier in Sevier County are within 25 miles
of the Pine Creek Interchange and are located North and
Northeast, respectively, of the Pine Creek Interchange. (R-4850) The settlement of Cove Fort is located approximately 3
miles nonh of the Pine Creek Interchange.
The unincorporated area of Beaver County is for the
most part public domain and state-owned land. A large part
of it is either mountains or uncultivated land: There· are abour
285 farms in the area. The census fixes the emire population
of the county at 4,235. This includes a population of 1,653
in the city of Beaver, 1,556 in the city of Milford and about
550 in the town of Minersville. The county consists of approxi·
mately 2,750.00 square miles and all of the area is unincor·
porated with the exception of the cities of Beaver and Milford
and the town of Minersville. (Pre-trial Order).
The lands involved in these actions were used for grazing
and suited for grazing when the Zoning Resolution was adopt·
ed in 1959, (R-266-268; Exhibit l) and such lands are still

..,
I

smted tor grazing. (R-101).
When the freeway is completed, it will pass along the
western edge of Beaver City 5 blocb west of the existing
Main Street. (R-53). There is no zoning in Beaver City so
there is no restriction on the use of property within the city
boundaries. There is vacant space in the Commercial Zone
north ot Beaver City where commercial businesses could be
established, (D-7 3) and there is also considerable area south
ot Beaver City bordering Highway U.S. 91 which will provide access to the freeway where commercial businesses can
be locatc<l if the property is rezoned. (D-70-72). Plaintiffi
Chevron and Phillips have petroleum outlets in Beaver City,
(R-45; H-)1) and said plaintiffs were invited by the Beaver
County Planning Commission to come into the available
space in or near Beaver City to construct their proposed new
tacilities. (Exhibit 17) The economy of eastern Beaver County
is heavily dependent on tourist business with. substantial1y
more than one-third of the retail sales in Beaver City being
made at service stations, restaurants, motels, etc. (D-64-65)
The existing tourist facilities in and near Beaver City are
generally sufficient. (D-67).
Most of the existing communities of Southern Utah are
m serious need of economic growth. They are already too
small to provide all of the community sei:vjces that modern
living demands. Beaver City has one doctor, one drug store,
one hospital recently acquired, one laundromat, on dry cleaning establishment, one barber shop, one ladies clothing store,
one mens clothing store, one moving picture theater, etc. Any
substantial reduction in the business activity in or near Beaver
City would likely result in the loss of any one or all of those
services. (R-288-9).
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Since the trial in this action, the State Highway Department of Utah and the Bureau of Public Roads have changed
their policy and have redesigned the interchanges at both ends
of Beaver City so as to enable traffic at either interchange
traveling in either direction to both leave and return to the
freeway and proceed in either direction when returning to
the freeway, commonly called 4-way movement interchanges.
This will permit easy access to an<l from the freeway at each
end of Beaver City for all freeway travelers, at least equal to
the access at Pine Creek Hill. Beaver City is now in the
process of annexing to its corporate area the properties contained in the present Commercial Zone north of Beaver City
as well as the additional properties to the interchange and Jt
is virtually certain that such annexation will be completed in
the near future thus enabling commercial development to the
mtcrchange. The traveling public can be better served in and
near Beaver City than at Pine Creek because of the additional
l>ervices available in the community.
Beaver County furnishes tire protection in the unincorporated territory of the County. The law enforcement personnel which the County finances consists of a county sheriff, one
full-time chief deputy and one part-time deputy an<l a county
attorney. Beaver County has a health department consisting
of the Board of County Commissioners, a health officer and
a public health nurse.
There are other interchanges :ilong Highway 1-15 in
in Beaver County which provide access to the freeway corn·
parable to that at Pine Creek Interchange and which could
be adapted to commercial uses. (Exhibits 14 and 15).
The Beaver County Commissioners provided for an
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H-1 Highway-Service Zone m the Zoning Resolution so
that land could be zoned tor that use at some future time it
an<l when need therefor arises, but they made no legislative
determination that such a zone was needed at the time of
the adoption of the Resolution or at any otner specihc rim.:.
(R-287-8). As contrasted to the 24 miles trom Beaver City
north to Cove Fort and the 31 miles trom Beaver City south
w Paragonah, it is approximately 70 miles from the city of
Milford in Beaver County west along Highway U-21 to the
next community which is Garrison in Millard County. (Exhibit l). U 21 is an improved highway in that area and
provides a direct route trom Highway 1-70 where it dead
ends near Cove Fort, Utah, to central Nevada and central
California points. Therefore, the highway running west of
Milford to the Beaver-Millard county line is an area where
highway services between existing communities would be
most needed in the future.
The County Planning Commission which originally drafted the Zoning Resolution of Beaver County and the County
Planning Commission which considered plaintiffs' petition
tor rezoning, and the Board of County Commissioners which
originally adopted the Zoning Resolution and the Board
ot County Commissioners which considered plaintiffs'· petition
tor rezoning, represented a variety of economic and social
interests in the county and much study was made before the
Resolution was adopted. (R-405-409; R-263-293).
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POINTS RELIED UPON

POINT I
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEA VER
COUNTY IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
BEING CONFISCATORY OF PLAINTIFFS'
PROPERTIES.
POINT II
NEITHER THE INITIAL ADOPTION OF THE
ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER COUNTY,
NOR THE REFUSAL BY THE BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS TO REZONE
PLAINTIFFS' RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITIONS, WAS
UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY OR CAPRI•
CIOUS.
A.
ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION WAS NOT··
COUNTY'S OBJECTIVE.

B.
PUBLIC NEED MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST
PRIVATE INTEREST.
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c.
STABILITY OF ZONING PLAN NECESSARY.

D.
TOTAL TAX BASE MIGHT BE REDUCED.

E.
lNCREASbD COST OF COUNTY POLICE, FIRE,
Ht:ALTH A1\JD OTHER SERVICES.

F.
NO PUBLIC NEED FOR PINE CREEK FACILITIES.
G.
ALL 11\JTERCHANGt:S
Rt.ZONING.

COULD

DEMAND

H.

DlFFlCULT TO SUPERVISE CONDUCT IN
RbMOTE AREA.

I.
PLAINTIFFS Ht\ vE NO COMPELLING PRIVATE NEED.
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].
COUNTY
NEEDS.

COMMISSION

KNOWS

LOCAL

POINT III
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER
COUNTY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT HIGHWAY
SERVICE FACILITIES
ARE NEEDED AT PINE
CREEK HILL THEREBY REQUIRING A REZONING OF PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTIES AS
H-1 HIGHWAY SERVICE.
A.

ZONING RESOLUTION ,OF BEAVER COUNTY
DOES NOT FREEZE BUSINESS.

B.
INTENTION WAS TO DEFER DESIGNATION
OF LAND AS HIGHWAY SERVICE UNTIL
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.
POINT IV
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER
COUNTY IS NOT VOID AS CONTENDED BY
PLAINTIFFS PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY AND DESERET INVESTORS GROUP
BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT IT STATES
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IN ITS PREAMBLE TO BE FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE INHABITANTS OF BEAVER COUNTY
RATHER THAN THE INHABITANTS OF
THE STATE OF UT AH.
POINT V
THE ADOPTION OF A MASTER PLAN IS NOT
A PRE-REQUISITE TO THE ADOPTION BY
A COUNTY OF A ZONING RESOUUTION.
POINT VI
BEAVER COUNTY'S ZONING IS NOT A
BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
POINT VII
THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROVIDES NO GROUND FOR ALTERATION OF
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ACTION.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER
COUNTY IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
BEING CONFISCATORY OF PLAINTIFFS'
PROPERTIES.
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Plaintiffs' contention that the Zoning Resolution of Beaver
County is unconstitutional and void in that it is confiscatory
of plaintiffs' properties is without merit.
In all of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs in support
of their contention, either the property involved was not suited
for the purpose for which it was zoned at the time of the
adoption of the zoning ordinance or the property became un·
suited for the purpose for which it was zoned after the adoption
of the zoning ordinance because of a change in circumstances.
the case at bar, the lands involved were used for
and were suited for grazing at the time of the adoption of the
Zoning Resolution in 1959 and they continu<: to be as suited
for grazing now as they ever were so far as their productivity
and other characteristics are concerned. The difference is that
the plaintiffs, several years after the adoption of the Zoning
Resolution, voluntarily severed the lands involved in this
litigation from the larger tracts of which they were formerly
a part. Grazing lands of this character must be used in relatively
large tracts. The plaintiffs spernlated that the lands could be
rezoned and now, upon learning that they miscalculated the
attitude of the zonin3 authority, they wish to have the court
rectify their mistake. If a land owner can divide his land into
small parcels and fore= a rezoning on the basis that the land as
so divided is no longer suited for the purpose for which it was
zoned as plaintiffs are attempting to do in this case, no zoning
authority can hereafter adopt a binding regulation zoning land
as agricultural, grazing or other use that necessarily requires
a large tract. The presence of the freeway has not deprived
the land of its suitability for grazing any more than the pre·
sence of Highway U.S. 91 has done in the past.
in
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An argument similar to that made by the plaintiffs in
this case was presented to this court in the case of Douse v.
Salt Lake City, 123 U. 107, 255 P. 2d 723, wherein the
plaintiff alleged that his property was zoned for residential
but it was not suited for residential and it had a greater value
as commercial or industrial property and the existing zoning
was, therefore, unconstitutional as t0 his property as being
confiscatory. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument in that case,
this court said:
"In this jurisdiction the discretionary power to district
and zone cities for various purposes incident to the
public interesr is granted to the governing body of
the city by stature. Sec. 10-9-1, 2, 3, U. C. A. 1953.
Palpably the excercise of the zoning power is a legislative function and activity. Walton v. Tracy Loan
& Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P. 2d 7 24, 726. The
wisdom of the plan, the necessity, the number, nature
and boundaries of the district are matters which lie in
the discretion of the City authorities, and only if their
action is confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitrary may
the court set aside their action. Marshall v. Salt Lake
City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P. 2d 704, 149 A. L. R.
282. The fact that plaintiff's one-half lot might be
more profitably used for commercial than for residential purposes, or indeed, the fact that it has become
unsuited for residential purposes does not show discrimination or reveal arbitrary action.

POINT II
NEITHER THE INITIAL ADOPTION OF THE
ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER COUNTY.
NOR THE REFUSAL BY THE BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS TO REZONE
PLAINTIFFS' RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITIONS, WAS
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UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY OR CAPRl-

CIOUS.

The decision on a zoning question of the county commissioners, city council or other zoning authority will not be set
aside and the court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the zoning authority unless the decision of the zoning
authority is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. This proposition has been the holding of several decisions of this court
including the following: Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11
U. 2d 307, 358 pl 2d 633; Salt Lake County v. Hutchinson,
8 U. 2d 154, 329 P. 2d 657; Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105
U. 111, 141 P. 2d 704; Dowse v. Salt Lake City, 123 U. 107,
255 P. 2d 723; Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City,
116 U. 536, 212 P. 2d 177; Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 17 U
2d, 300, 410 P. 2d, 764.

In Gayland v. Salt Lake County, supra, the foregoing
principle is clearly stated as follows:
"In zoning, as in any legislative action, the functioning
authority has wide discretion. Its action is endowed
with a presumption of validity; and it is the court's
duty to resolve all do:Jbts in favor thereof and not to
interfere with the Commission's action unless it clearly
appears to be beyond its power; or is unconstitutional
for some such reason as it deprives one of property
without due process of law, or capriciously and arbitrarily infringes upon his rights therein. or is unjustly
discriminatory. The burden was upon the plaintiff to
show that the Commission's action was suffused with
one or more of those faults, which burden has not
been sustained. Even though it be true that information was presented at the h::-aring which would h~ve
justified the Commission in amf'nding the. zon~ng
ordiPance as advocated. it is also rrue that the s1tuanon
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presented can be so viewed as to point to the conclusion
that the action taken was reasonable and proper. Under
such circumstances it was not the prerogative of the
court to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission."
The statute which defines the purposes for which zoning
may be done by a county is Section 17-27-13, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, which states:
"Such regulations shall be designed and enacted for
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals,
convenience, order, prosperity or welfare of the present
and future inhabitants of the state of Utah, including,
amongst other things, the lessening of congestion in
the streets or roads or reducing the waste of excessive
amounts of roads, securing safety from fire and other
dangers, providing adequate light and air, classification
of land uses and distribution of land development and
utilization, protection of the tax base, securing economy
in governmental expenditures, fostering the state's
agricultural and other industries, and the protection of
both urban and nonurban development."
As the subjunchve "or" is used in this statute, the county
commissioners act within the· power· granted if the zoning
regulations fulfill any one of the stated purposes. Zoning
the plaintiffs' properties involved in these actions as G-1
Grazing is reasonable and within the power granted as shown
by the following:

ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION WAS NOT
COUNTY'S OBJECTIVE.
It is contended by plaintiff that the Zoning Resolution
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of Beaver County was adopted and is being adnunistered for
the purpose of eliminating competition for the business men
in Beaver City. Defendants deny this contention. There are
several locations within the corporate limits of Beaver City
and in the Commercial Zone north of Beaver City where
commercial businesses to serve the traveling public as well
as local residents can be established. (D-73) There is also
considerable area south of Beaver City bordering Highway
U.S. 91 which will provide access to the freeway where commercial businesses can be located. (D-70-72) This area is
presently zoned A-1 Agricultural but it can be rezoned to C-1
Commercial if and when demand and need dictate. (Exhibit
1) Such new businesses would compete with the now existing
businesses. The existing businesses include numerous service
stations, motels and restaurants and they presently compete
among themselves. It is obvious that competition has not
been eliminated in the area and is not likely to be done in
the future. Whenever an application is made to rezone property for commercial use and there are existing similar commercial areas in the same vicinity, the same question of elimination of competition can arise; however, although zoning
cannot be used for the expressed purpose of eliminating competition to existing businesses, the zoning authority may deny
such applications for rezoning if such denial is otherwise
proper even though competition is in fact incidentally thereby
reduced.
In Gayland v. Salt Lake County, supra, the dispute was
as to the attempt to rezone 10 acres of land in the vicinity of
1300 East and 5600 South Streets in :::ialt Lake County south
east of Salt Lake City from residential (R-2) to commercial
(C-2). The County Commissioners denied the application and
rhe Supreme Court up he Id that action. The applicant desired
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to construct a shopping center on the land to be rezoned. By
denying this applICation, rhe compernion which the proposed
new shopping center would have presented to other existing
shoppmg centers which could serve the same customers was
eliminated. This tact, however, did not deprive the County
Commissioners of the right to deny the application.

In Douse v. Salt Lake City, supra, the property sought
to be rezoned was zoned residential in an area where several
blocks in the immediate vicinity were zoned commercial. The
applicant alleged that his property had potential commeroal
or industrial value. The application for rezoning was denied
and the Supreme Court upheld the denial. lt is obvious mar
competition with the nearby commercial areas was thereby
eliminated.
Since there are numerous service stations in Beaver City,
one of which is owned by plaint1tt Pnillips _t}ecroleum Company and one of which is owned by plaintiff Chevron Oil
Company, it is ridiculous to suppose that the Beaver County
Commissioners would attempt to prohibit competition by
rhese plaintifts and other oil companies at Pine Creek Hill
from the existing facilities ot these two plaintiffs and other
011 companies located in Beaver City.

B.
PUBLIC NEED MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST
PRIVATE INTEREST.
ln determining whether or not a zoning decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, the public need must
be wt1ghed against the private interest of the property owner.
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Most ot the existing communities of Southern 'Utah are
m serious need of economrc growm. Tney are a!feaay too
small to provide all ot the community servrces that modern
llvmg demands. Beaver City has one doctor, one drug store,
one hospital recently acquired, one laundromat, one dry clean·
mg estabhshment, one barber shop, one ladies clothing store,
one mens clothmg store, one moving picture theater, ere.
Any substantial reduction in the busmess activity in or near
Beaver City would likely result in the loss of any one or all
oi those servrces. A lack of such services makes it difficult
1r not impossible to attract teachers, mdustry and other res1·
dents to come to the area and the disintegration of community
11te contmues until 1t is virtually eliminated. (R-288-9) What
is in the best interest ot the inlrnbitants or me mcorporated
areas ot Beaver County 1s a1so m me best mterest or the
mhabitants ot the unmcorporared areas as each is dependent
upon the other. Therefore, it is in the best interest of all of
the residents ot Beaver County that tuture commercial busi·
nesses be encouraged to locate in or near t11e existing com·
munities. Permiting the small business centers to be divided
into more smaller busmess centers whrch will occur if plaintiffs'
property at Pine Creek Hill is rezoned for commercial use,
will result in a break down of the business climate and a
scattering or the smail population centers into still smaller
centers and the deterioration oi commumty life. (R-288-SJJ.
There is nothing in this record to indicacte any effort to freeze
business at its present level. The theory of plaintiffs' evidence
seems to be that a commercial development at Pine Creek
Hill will bring new rourist business into the area, but such
is not the case. Such a development will create no new market
demand. Either the traveling public will acquire their goods
and services at Pine Creek Hill or at some other location in
the same area for they will not and cannot continue to some
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remote area to acquire gasoline, food, sleeping accomodations
and other facilities. Therefore, a development at Pine Creek
Hill would not add to the economic growth of the area in
any respect.
The business at Pine Creek Hill would be dependent
almost entirely upon tourist trade, and, as tourist trade fluctuates greatly between the summer and winter seasons, rm:
personnel needed to operate the Pine Creek Hill installations
would also fluctuate and would probably be imported from
remote areas so that the opportunity tor employment at these
facilities for the local residents would be diminished compared
m what it would be if the taoht1es were near the existing
communities where the business would be more dependent
on local trade and more uniform. Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, there is no assurance that the employees at Pine Creek
Hill would reside or spend their money in Beaver County.
(R-45-51)

c.
STABILITY OF ZONING PLAN NECESSARY.
Another public need is stability in land use so that land
owners can anticipate with some degree of certainty the future
economic and social developmc:i.t. This is one of the purposes
for which zoning was devised. Development without zoning
is peace meal and eratic. To rezone whenever a land owne1
is <lispleasd with the present arrangement jeopardizes such
stability. Rezoning should be done only upon a determination
that it will not seriously and adversly affect the remainder of the
community. If the County Commissioners in the case at bar
are not sustained in their designation of where commercial
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developments are to be located in Beaver County, then the
legislative power of zoning authorities throughout the state
to classify land according to its use will be seriously jeopardized.

D.
TOTAL TAX BASE MIGHT BE REDUCED.
Plaintiffs' attempt to show that the proposed development
at Pine Creek Hill would increase the tax base of Beaver
County. It is true that the assessed value of plaintiffs' property
would increase when the proposed improvement would become
completed, but the damage which the development would
have on the rest of the county as above shown would eventually
result in a greater decrease of tax base elsewhere than plaintiffs' property would be increased. As the general business
climate and community life disintegrated and residents moved
out of the county. the tax base would eventually seriously
decrease.

E.
INCREASED COST OF COUNTY POLICE, FIRE,
HEALTH AND OTHER SERVICES.
A commercial development at Pine Creek Hill would
result in increased cost of county government services. Beaver
County does have a fire department 'lnd has law enforcement
officials and both would be called upon to render aid when
the need would arise. (R-60-61) Families residing at Pine
Creek Hill would also need to have their children transported
to school. (R-290) An area so remote from the community
would attract those persons who wish to escape the restrictions
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ot the law and a law enforcemem problem would result.
Health and sanitation at this remote location would also create
additional cost and law enforcement problems to the county.
It is inevitable that these governmental services would be
required regardless of plaintiffs' present plans to provide some
of these services by themselves. If all of the properties involved
in these two actions were to be zoned Highway-Service,
numerous facilities of various types could be constructed thereby involving the county to a much greater extent than the
rwo service stations now anticipated by Chevron and Phillips.
(Exhibit 1, 8-5-2; H-41-42; R-50-51)
F.

NO PUBLIC NEED FOR PINE CREEK FACILITIES.
There is no public need for commercial facilities at Pine
Creek Hill. The proposed development is approximately 21
miles north of Beaver City and approximately the same distance south of the town of Kanosh, and that distance requires
less than 20 minutes of -driving at permitted freeway speed
and slightly more than one gallon of gasoline. The occasional
motorist who finds himself m immediate need of service
between Beaver and Kanosh can acquire most automotive
services at Cove Fort which is approximately 3 miles north of
Pine Creek Hill. The tourist facilities at Beaver are healthful,
decent and generally sufficient (D-65-67) and can be added
to as need requires. The same can also be done at Kanosh,
Fillmore, Cedar City and other communities along the highway. The evidence in the record indicates that highway traffic
must leave the freeway when going into Beaver City and
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continue through the entire length of Beaver's Main Street
in order to return to the freeway at the interchange on the
other end. Since the trial in this action, the State Highway
Department of Utah and the Bureau of Public Roads have
changed their policy and have redesigned the interchanges
at both ends of Beaver City so as to enable traffic at either
interchange traveling in either direction to both leave and
rerurn to the freeway and proceed in either direction when
rerurning to the freeway, commonly called 4-way movement
interchanges. This will permit easy access to and from the
freeway at each end of Beaver City for all freeway travelers,
at least equal to the access at Pine Creek Hill. Beaver City
is now in the process of annexing to its corporate area the
properties contained in the present Commercial Zone north
of Beaver City as well as the additional properties to the
interchange and it is virtually certain that such annexation will
be completed in the near furure, thus enabling commercial
development to the interchange. The traveling public can be
better served in and near Beaver City than at Pine Creek
because of the additional services available in the community.

G.
ALL INTERCHANGES COULD DEMAND REZONING.

If rezoning is done at the interchange at Pine Creek
Hill, the county will have no justification to refuse rezoning
at all other interchanges along the freeway. Modern engineer·
ing techniques make it possible to adapt an area to the srruc·
rural and topographical needs of a commercial installation
so that topographic considerations now have lesser importance.
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Other interchanges provide comparable access with Pine Creek
Hill for highway travelers. (Exhibits 14 and 15) The result
would be a series of small oases in the desert.
H.

DIFFICULT TO SUPERVISE CONDUCT IN
REMOTE AREA.
With the development of motels, trailer courts and
restaurants at Pine Creek Hill, its distance from incorporated
communities would make it attractive for young people who
wish to escape from the supervision or their parents and law
enforcement officials. The result could be liquor violations.
gambling, sexual offenses, drug traffic and other associated
offenses which would be difficult to control, thereby causing
a serious threat to morals.

I.
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO COMPELLING PRIVATE NEED.
As contrasted to the public need to sustain the district
court's decision, as above set forth, there is no substantial
private interest to be served by rezoning Pine Creek Hill.
Plaintiffs' and other petroleum dealers have numerous outlets
up and down the freeway. Their customers must obtain their
products and services in order to travel and they can be obtained whereever available. A development at Pine Creek Hill
will neither add to the number of plaintiffs' customers nor to
the number of travelers upon the highway nor to the amount
of products and services which plaintiffs would sell. Plaintiffs
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will incure no loss in the operation of their businesses. The
same principals apply to other facilities that might be constructed at Pine Creek Hill.

J.
COUNTY
NEEDS.

COMMISSION

KNOWS

LOCAL

The County Planning Commission which originally drafted the Zoning Resolution of Beaver County and the County
Planning Commission which considered plaintiffs' petition for
rezoning, and the Board of County Commissioners which
originally adopted the Zoning Resolution and the Board of
County Commissioners which considered plaintiffs' petition
for rezoning represented a variety of economic and social
interests in the county and much study was made before· the
Resolution was adopted. (R-405-409; R-263-293)
The evidence is adundant that Eastern Beaver County
is highly_deRendent upon tourist business in its economy, and
the county Commissioners should be left _to_ determine how
best the County can benefit from that tourist business. Mr.
Burnham testified that rezoning Pine Creek Hill would be
iri the best interest of the county while Mr. Dispain testified
that it would not be in the best interest of the County to
re~on~ Pine Creek Hill. If these two informed experts honestly
differ on the question, how can it be said that the County
Commissioners were unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious
in their decision?
POINT III
THE

ZONING

RESOLUTION OF BEAVER

COUNTY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT HIGHWAY
SERVICE FACILITIES ARE NEEDED AT PINE
CREEK HILL THEREBY REQUIRING A REZONING OF PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTIES AS
H-1 HIGHWAY SERVICE.

A.
ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER COUNTY
DOES NOT FREEZE BUSINESS.
In support of plaintiffs' contention that such a legislativ~
determination was made thereby requiring a zoning of their
properties for highway service facilitiel>, they cite the cases. of
Ex Parte White, 234 Pac 396; Wickham v. Becker, 274
Pac. 397.
Both of those cases were appa:ently decided upon_ the
fact that the zoning regulation adopted provided no land for
commercial use other than that then being used for that purpose so that no commercial expansion was possible. In the
case at bar there is additional land provided in the Commercial
Zone that is not now being used for commercial purposes
(D. 7 3) and the plaintiffs, rather than being denied of the
right to conduct business, were invited into ·the established
commercial area: (Exhibit 17.)

B.
INTENTION WAS TO DEFER DESIGNATION
OF LAND AS HIGHWAY SERVICE UNTIL
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.
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The intention of the County Commissioners was clearly
stated by Dale Dispain in his testimony: (R-287-8) The only
legislative determination that was made was that there might
be a need at some future time for highway service facilities
along a freeway several miles from an existing community,
but no determination as to place, time or condition was made.
The decision of whether or not to create a highway-service
zone and, if so, where, how many, etc., were left for future
determination. That question was def ered by the County
Commissioners at the time of the adoption of the Zoning
Resolution and it should continue to be defered for decision
by them in their continuing legislative function in the zoning
field. Plaintiffs' contention that Pine Creek Hill is the logical
place for a highway-service zone becomes untenable when the
zoning map attached to Exhibit 1 is examined and the long
distance appears between the City of Milford along the highway running west to where it intersects with the northern
boundary line of Beaver County. It is approximately 50 mile>
from Milford to the county line and approximately 70 miles
from Milford to the next community which is Garrison, in
Millard County. If a0d when a freeway were to be built
connecting Milford and Garrison as a connecting link between
Highway I-7 0 and the West Coast, highway-service facilities
would be far more logical in that area than along I-15 north
of Beaver City.
POINT IV
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER
COUNTY IS NOT VOID AS CONTENDED BY
PLAINTIFFS PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY AND DESERET INVESTORS GROUP
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BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT IT STATES
IN ITS PREAMBLE TO BE FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE INHABITA.i'-!TS OF BEA VER COUNTY
RATHER THAN THE INHABITANTS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH.
A county zoning resolution is not void be reason of the
fact that its preamble states that i~ is adopted tor the benefit
of the inhabitants of the county adopting it. Such a statement
contains no implication that the purpose ot the ordinance is
contrary to the interest ot the remaining inhabitants of the
state. It is not necessary that a zoning resolution have a pre·
amble at all. The determining test is what the ordinance
actually does, that is, whether its provisions in fact benefit the
present and future inhabitants of the State of Utah or whether
they actually are against the interest of such inhabitants. The
Zoning Resolution of Beaver County does benetit the present
and future inhabitants of the State of Utah and it contains
no provision to the contrary. (Exhibit 1)
POINT V
THE ADOPTION OF A MASTER PLAN IS NOT
A PRE-REQUISITE TO THE ADOPTION BY
A COUNTY OF A ZONING RESOUUTION.
While plaintiffs do not argue in their briefs that the
adoption of a master plan is a ·pre-requisite to the adoption
by a county of a zoning resolution, they do assert the fact
that Beaver County did not adopt a master plan prior to the
adoption of the Zoning Resolution of Beaver County in 1959.
The adoption of a master plan is provided for by Section
17-27-4, et seq, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the adoption
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of a zoning resolution is provided for by Section 17-27-9,
et seq, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Either can be adopted
by a county but neither is a pre-requisite to the other. This
question was decided as herein stated by the case of Gayland
v. Salt Lake County, 11 U. 2d 307, 358 P. 2d 633.

POINT VI
BEAVER COUNTY'S ZONING IS NOT A
BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The contention of plaintiffs Phillips Petroleum Company
and Deseret Investors Group that the Zoning Resolution of
Beaver County burdens interstate commerce is without merit.
If such a contention is valid, then interstate travelers have
been similarly burdened throughout all of the time that they
have been using the highways of the nation because highways
used by interstate travelers have customarily passed through
communities and interstate travelers have been required to
pass through communities whether needing services or nor
until the very recent development of the freeway system in
some parts of the nation. Even viewing the Zoning Resolution
of Beaver County in the light proposed by plaintiffs, travelers
needing services while in Beaver County would be required to
travel only a few city blocks further than their fellow traveler:;
who do not need such services. However, with the recenr
developments since the trial of the planned four-way inter·
changes at each access from Highway I-15 to Beaver City and
the anticipated commercial expansion particularly to the north·
em interchange, travelers on I-15 will have as convenient
access to highway services in and near Beaver City as can be
made available at Pine Creek Hill and the services available
will probably be more extensive.
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POINT .VII
THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROVIDES NO GROUND FOR ALTERATION OF
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ACTION.
In view of the rulings contained in the Memorandwn
Decision of the district court in these actions and in view oi
the fact that it was obvious that an appeal would be on the
whole record as has been the case, it is difficult to see that
findings of fact and more formal conclusions of law would
have served any worth while purpose. However, defendants
have no objection to the entry of formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law and judgment so long as they are in accord
with the Memorandum Decision. It is to be observed that
no plaintiff proposed or requested any additional documents
and that the respective notices of appeal were based upon the
Memorandum Decision. Therefor, findings of fact and conclusions of law were in effect waived so far as the appeal
1s concerned.

If the failure to make findings of fact does not prejudice
any party, the error is harmless. (Leighton v. One William
Street Fund, 343 F 2d 565) No prejudice has been alleged
in the case at bar.
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SUMMARY
The Zoning Resolution of Beaver County is valid in its
entirety and as applied to plaintiffs' properties, and the Board
of County Commissioners acted reasonably and within their
lawful powers in denying plaintiffs' application for rezoning.
The Supreme Court should affirm the District Court's judgment.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN 0. CHRISTIANSEN
A. M. FERRO
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents.

